

Contemporary Developments in Phenomenological Research

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Berger and Luckmann enhanced the pattern, started by Schutz, of weakening phenomenology with standard sociological hypothesis. This made for a well-known and, ostensibly, all the more intense mix, however their compositions were extremely unique and no more observationally situated than those of Schutz. Remarking on the condition of phenomenology amid the mid-1970s, George Psathas proposed that it was incidentally slowed down in an automatic and analytical stage: As a component of the present phase of improvement of a phenomenologically based sociology, a large number of these creators think that it's important to expound the hypothetical and philosophical underpinnings of their work before continuing with their studies.

Starting in the 1980s, be that as it may, phenomenology took an emphatically experimental turn. Norman Denzin was a transitional figure. His work was experimentally grounded, not interpretative, but rather the title of his article, *Toward a Phenomenology of Domestic Family Violence*, suggested monogamous dedication to a solitary hypothetical system. The up and coming era of phenomenologically tinged sociologists would be audaciously exact, yet indiscriminate with their theoretical motivations. In reality, dissimilar to Psathas and Denzin, they don't wear phenomenology on their sleeves. They are initiating a dish interactionism in which an exactly based phenomenology is one and only of a few key parts. The agent researchers don't recognize themselves as entirely phenomenological sociologists in light of the fact that this new hypothetical structure incorporates components of typical interactionism, Goffman's microstructuralism, and ethnomethodology.

One of the main professionals is Jack Katz, and his momentous book, *Seductions of Crime*, embodies this class. Shunning the customary accentuation on foundation elements, for example, race, class, and sex, Katz rather focuses on the particulars of experiential points of interest in the amazing forefront – that is, the lived experience of one's own criminal conduct. There is, then, a well-known accentuation on subjectivity, experiential imagination, and the social development of various substances: What phenomenology extraordinarily has acknowledged is not just that a man's lived world is his ancient rarity however that by encountering himself as an item controlled by otherworldly powers, an individual can really encounter another or distinctive world. This line of request prompts a significant feeling of incongruity concerning the argumentative and self-beguiling characteristics of agentic behavior: My general goal in this book is to exhibit that the reasons for wrongdoing are developed by the guilty parties themselves, yet the reasons they build are draws and weights that they encounter as autonomously moving them toward wrongdoing.

Seductions of Crime is an information driven treatise, and the observational materials are very different. Katz requests reports of shoplifting, robbery, and vandalism from understudies in his classes; he gathers the discoveries of different ethnographic studies; he gathers the distributed life stories and collections of memoirs of different hoodlums; and he makes broad utilization of police records. In a further break with phenomenology's against experimental causes, Katz advocates the utilization of systematic instigation – an interpretive methodology initially proposed by Florian Znaniecki. Albeit established in an observational epistemology, it looks to some extent like Husserl's phenomenological methods. One endeavors to diminish specific occurrences of a marvel to its dynamic pith. The analyst is resolved to frame an immaculate connection in the middle of information and clarification, as Katz puts it. While experiencing a 'negative case' – proof repudiating the momentum clarification – the analyst must change it into a revising so as to affirm case the

hypothesis. His refined and systematized variant of investigative incitement offers methodological connection with Merleau-Ponty's request that all the fractional perspectives one gets a quick look at must be welded together.

The twin topics of applied and methodological variance are explained in an ensuing book, *How Emotions Work*. Here, Katz plans a tripartite social-mental hypothesis that joins components of Freudian analysis with Mead and Goffman's interactionism and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body. Inside of this syncretic hypothetical structure, Katz inspects four of the regular enthusiastic encounters in ordinary life: outrage, chuckling, disgrace, and crying. His methodology is inventive, however his point is as per the phenomenological concentrate on subjectivity. This book is completely observational, be that as it may. Katz amasses a complex arrangement of subjective systems for information gathering, including broad utilization of tape. By and by, he comprehends various information by method for logical incitement.

All through the 1980s, there was significant verbal confrontation between researchers who upheld the constructionist and the positivist ideal models in the humanism of feelings. To bolster their individual positions, the constructionists indicated diverse variety in feelings though the positivists focused on culturally diverse consistency. This civil argument laid on a crucial misguided judgment and its culmination: that the body is the main widespread part of humankind and, in this way, that culturally diverse parallel in the feelings must be predicated upon physiological procedures. Dismissing this position, I showed that the fundamental elements of cleverness and beguilement are gotten from all inclusive motion in the social development of reality. On the off chance that, as Mehan and Wood have contended, conventional social connection is reality work, and then we can understand the phenomenological pith of funniness as reality play – deliberate or unexpected action that includes a freeing and moderately safe toying with the implicitly accepted desires pertinent to a specific circumstance.

Like the feelings, this theme speaks to a feature of subjectivity, and, as we have seen, the examination of inward time awareness has a long family in the phenomenological writing. Likewise with Katz, then again, my exploration breaks with the past by prudence of being exactly grounded in account materials which are analyzed through a procedure of investigative instigation. The subsequent hypothesis goes for securing the phenomenological quintessence of inner time cognizance, and that hypothesis is built from the theoretical building pieces we find in the works of Mead, Schutz, Goffman, and Garfinkel.

In respect to the goal or enormous time of tickers and timetables, our subjective experience of time can appear to pass gradually, rapidly, or synchronously. This variety mirrors the thickness of cognizant data preparing occasioned by one's quick circumstances. Risky circumstances incite enthusiastic concern and subjective inclusion with self and circumstance, in this way expanding the thickness of experience per standard fleeting unit. Accordingly, time appears to pass gradually. Two diverse however related procedures make for the feeling that time has passed rapidly. To begin with, a few circumstances request a lot of testing however unproblematic action. Given that one is acquainted with, and potentially prepared for, the requests of this circumstance, one can act without much reluctance or thoughtfulness regarding time itself, along these lines decreasing the thickness of experience per standard transient unit. At the point when one thinks back, time appears to have flown by. Second, it is additionally the case that the disintegration of wordy memory decreases the thickness of involvement in all recollected interims, bringing about the almost all inclusive feeling that time flies. At long last, it is workable for one's experience to be generally synchronized with the season of timekeepers and logbooks on the grounds that recognition with the ordinary thickness of data preparing empowers one to make an interpretation of subjective experience into standard transient units and the other way around. Scott Harris is a third researcher whose work typifies late advancements in phenomenological humanism. He takes an interactionist way to deal with the investigation of equity in conjugal connections, in any case, obviously, it is not equity in essence which is at issue. Suggesting Berger and Luckmann's theoretical model, Harris battles that equity is not a free, goal, or plainly obvious trademark but rather is a socially developed wonder. In like manner, his phenomenological roots are obvious when he endeavors to section "reality" about the presence and significance of imbalance with a specific end goal to open an explanatory space for the interpretive investigation of "cases making" and the impression of equity and disparity in conjugal connections.

In his works, Harris demonstrates to us what has happened to phenomenology. In the first place, there is a substantive spotlight on subjectivity – that is, the way people characterize their associations with others. Second, there is a syncretic hypothetical system that coordinates typical interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and Goffman's microstructuralism. Despite the fact that Harris draws unequivocally from the legacy of Alfred Schutz, he sees it as

"reciprocal to typical interactionism." Third, there is an unmistakably observational introduction toward the investigation of account materials. Harris puts "information" in quotes to separate himself from standard positivism, however the way that he summons this term bespeaks a pledge to the evidentiary standards of intersubjectivity.

These attributes are no less obvious in my own particular work and in addition that of Katz. Unexpectedly, then, phenomenology has earned a spot at the sociological table, however just by developing far from separatism and adjusting itself to similarly invested experts of the exchange. It is, and will keep on being, a pivotal segment of the pan-interactionism that has developed as a capable worldview in contemporary humanism.

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